Abstract traces a message through the network from the initiator (the original sender of a message) to the responder (the final reAnonymity protocols are a privacy-enhancing technolceiver of a message). We focus on connection anonymity. ogy for Internet-based communication. 
quadratically with the number of participants in the netAnonymity can be divided into data anonymity and con- work. We then propose an improved protocol called Taxis, nection anonymity. Data anonymity [7] removes identifyand show that its message latency scales linearly with the ing data in messages, such as the sender address in an enumber of participants. Both models are validated with exmail. Connection anonymity [7] obscures the traffic comperimental measurements from a prototype implementation munication patterns. This prevents traffic analysis that of each protocol. Furthermore, we show that Taxis provides 978-1-4244-281 8-2/08/$25.00 (C2008 IEEE more scalable anonymous communication than Practical strong anonymity is that the sender anonymity set and the Buses, without compromising the anonymity provided.
receiver anonymity set are each equal to the anonymity set. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on anonymous commu-2.2. Mixes nication. Section 3 discusses the Practical Buses protocol and presents an analysis of its average message latency.
Chaum published his landmark paper on mixes [5] in Section 4 describes the new Taxis protocol, while Section 5 1981, pioneering a technique that provides very strong shows that its average message latency scales linearly. Sec- anonymity. The idea is to re-route a message through a tion 6 presents experimental results, while Section 7 shows sequence of mixes. In addition, the message is multiply that Taxis retains the strong anonymity guarantees of Pracencrypted (i.e., encrypted more than once), with a separate tical Buses. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
layer of encryption added for each mix along the reverse re-routing path. Each mix collects a batch of inputs, peels 2. Background and related work away a layer of encryption from each input, and randomly re-orders the outputs. The goal is to prevent an attacker from correlating an input message with its corresponding output message (assuming that the private key used by the mix is kept conAnonymous communication is a vibrant research area fidential). However, the events of an initiator sending a with many anonymity schemes proposed [1] . Applications message and a responder receiving a message also need such as e-mail, which are delay-tolerant, have incorporated to be hidden. The only proven secure solution requires strong anonymous communication schemes [8] . However, each initiator to send at least one message to each responinteractive applications, such as Web browsing and SSH, der in every single batch. This full cover tra ffc hides lerequire lower latency. Designing a strong anonymous comgitimate messages among the dummy messages. Uniform munication scheme with low overhead is an open research message size and replay protection are also required to preproblem [9] . As an interim solution, low-latency anonyserve anonymity [5] . mous communication schemes, such as Crowds [18] and
The problem with mixes is that the cover traffic scales Tor [9], have been used for interactive applications, despite quadratically with the number of participants. Debate vulnerabilities to known attacks [9] .
arises as to how much anonymity is sacrificed by reducing The three basic anonymity techniques are broadcastthe cover traffic [9] . Some schemes use no cover traffic, ing, mixes, and buses. Anonymous communication protopartial cover traffic, or almost full cover traffic. However, cols inherit their performance and anonymity strength from none of these are 100% secure against a dedicated adverthese underlying techniques.
sary, and few are suitable for interactive applications.
The broadcasting technique requires each participant to
Anonymous communication schemes such as Tor [9] broadcast to all the other participants the parity of its seand Crowds [18] The Practical Buses protocol [12, 13] extends buses [2] The message routing path will be N1 to N2 to N5 to N4, to improve its security and performance in practice. Each requiring more than one cycle of the bus to achieve delivparticipant owns a 'row' of bus seats, which it uses to send ery. The indirection nodes are N2 and N5, and the indirecand forward messages. To hide the event of a node replaction path length is I = 2. M is then multiply encrypted to ing a seat with a message to send or forward, each node EKN (EKN (EKN (M))) and placed on a seat owned by A1 replaces all of its owned seats each time it receives the work layer delays include transmission delay dxmit (the time fic for strong anonymity, nor do they require mixing. In to transmit the bits of the packet onto the link), propagation addition, a participant that handles a nested encrypted mesdelay (the time it takes for a bit to propagate through the sage can only identify the predecessor in the indirection network), processing delay (the time routers take to propath, while the successor is unknown.
cess and forward a packet), and queueing delay (the time Practical Buses provides strong mutual anonymity. It that a packet waits in router queues for processing). Transis not vulnerable to any known attacks, except denial of port layer delays include connection setup, flow and conservice (DoS) attacks [12] . The sender anonymity set and gestion control, and connection release. For simplicity, let receiver anonymity set both consist of the full anonymity propagation delay, processing delay, and queueing delay set.
be approximated by a constant c. In addition, assume that TCP (transport layer) delay can be ignored since persistent 3.2. Message latency analysis connections make this delay a one-time cost and we use an uncongested LAN environment. Since a bus consists of k The goal of our analysis of the Practical Buses protocol seats of size s bits for each of the n nodes, the bus size is is to model the average message latency: the elapsed time kns. If r denotes the transmission rate in bits per second, from when a message is entered to when the anonymous then dxmit = kns/r. Thus, the average network delay can be acknowledgement is received and processed. On According to our analysis, the message latency of the Practical Buses protocol is 0(n2), scaling quadratically # of bus tours with the number of participants. Experimental results from The average network delay per bus hop depends on dea prototype implementation confirm this observation (see lays introduced by the network and transport layers. NetSection 6).
The taxis protocol
The structure of a seat is illustrated in Figure 3 . There are three main parts: a seat header, a seat body containing 4.1. Motivation the nested message from Figure 2 , and a seat trailer.
Quadratic scalability of the message latency makes the Seat Owner's Public Key 'Practical' Buses protocol impractical. Equation (5) Data) forward flag is false, the node extracts the actual message from the inner core. A responder also sends an anonymous acknowledge- Figure 2 . Nested message structure.
ment by extracting the anonymous public key and message tag from the inner core of a received message. An anonyThe creation of the initial nested encrypted message inmous acknowledgement is created, encapsulated, and provolves choosing a random indirection path of random but cessed in an identical manner as a nested message, except bounded length. The inner core holds the actual message, the message type is set to acknowledgement, the message an anonymous public key (required for the receiver to send tag from the extracted message is used, and the anonymous an anonymous acknowledgement), and a random message public key is used to encrypt the inner core. Upon receivtag field. When adding a layer of encryption either for the ing the inner core, the message tag is extracted to identify receiver or an indirection node, a random AES key in the the message being acknowledged. salt field, the message type (nested message), a forward flag (true for every layer except the inner core), and the message 4.3. Taxi processing length (in bytes) are prepended to the current message content. The salt is encrypted with RSA-OAEP and the rest
The structure of a taxi is shown in Figure 4 . A taxi of the message is encrypted with AES using the salt field header identifies the type and the number of seats. Each value as the key.
contained seat has the structure indicated in Figure 3 .
[ Figure 4 . Taxi structure.
metaphorical fast lane for unowned taxis, which can be forwarded immediately after they are copied for local off-line processing.
* Reducedprocessing delay. Due to the segregation of The processing of a taxi consists of receiving, modifytaxis into two classes, the processing delay is reduced ing, and forwarding the taxi. An unowned taxi is always reby a factor of 0(n). As a result, the processing delay is ceived, copied, and then immediately forwarded using the reduced to the time it takes for the slowest participant 'fast lane', with the taxi contents processed off-line thereto modify its taxi. after. On the other hand, an owned taxi is received, modified, and then forwarded. An forwarded by previous participants that delayed their taxis. Recall that the network delay is reduced by a factor of bus or taxi peer first receives a message from the chat applin, and that the processing delay is reduced by a factor of cation and when the chat program receives the correspond-O(n). Dividing the respective Practical Buses model Equaing anonymous acknowledgement.
tions (3) and (4) by n yields:
The testing consisted of scaling from 2 to 14 particiks c pants. For each number of participants, a total of 360 mes-
sages with a random length between 1 byte and 2 KB are (2), (6), and (7) into the message Zipf distribution is approximated by having two "elephant" latency model for the Practical Buses protocol Equation (1) participants generate 50% of the traffic when there are more The only attack that an active adversary can use to defeat anonymity is to try to delete multiple taxis and reduce the The adversary monitors the taxis that circulate the netanonymity sets. In the best case, the adversary must repeatwork, recording when they stop at each of the participants.
edly delete all of the taxis before they are received by any It can then try to leverage this information to reduce either other participant, except the initiator's taxi, the responder's sender or receiver anonymity.
taxi, and the indirection participants' taxis that are used to An adversary can try to reduce sender anonymity by obforward the message. This reduces the anonymity set to serving when a participant sends a valid message through its minimum (I + 2), where I is the number of indirection an adversary to forward. The adversary has to then denodes. However, this presents a paradox for the adversary, termine if the predecessor is an initiator to defeat sender who must successfully guess the initiator, responder, and anonymity. This requires that the adversary eliminate the indirection participants within a short time window before possibility that no other participant sent the suspected inibeing detected. (Note that the attacker does not know the tiator a message to forward. As a result, any particirandom indirection path before the attack is launched.) The pants who exchange taxis with the suspected initiator could number of indirection paths for Taxis with n participants have forwarded the message through the suspected initiator.
and I indirection nodes is n'. Thus, as the size of the netClearly, if the taxis are regularly circulating the network, work grows, it becomes difficult for the adversary to guess the sender and receiver anonymity sets are not reduced.
the indirection path successfully. The same paradox arises An adversary can also try to reduce receiver anonymity.
when the attacker uses a combination of corrupted particiHowever, this is not feasible since an adversary cannot depants, and deleted taxis. Thus, the Taxis protocol maintains termine the predecessor in the indirection path.
the same anonymity strength as Practical Buses. 
